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African conflict diamonds - being diamonds originating from areas controlled by fac-
tions and groups opposed to legitimate government and used to fund such operations -
played a central role in many of the civil wars and conflicts that raged throughout sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite such conflicts having subsided, conflict
diamonds remain a pervasive problem for both Africa and the world at large. Current
efforts to eradicate the ills associated with conflict diamonds have, in the eyes of many,
fallen short, prompting calls for new and stricter regulations and oversight that would at
once curb the trade in illegal diamonds while at the same time allow for "legitimate"
diamonds to make their way to the marketplace and benefit the ailing African nations
from which they are mined. This comment will recall certain of that African history and
examine and critique various international enforcement regimes in hopes of shedding new
light on the problem.
Ishmael Beah was only thirteen years old when he was abducted from his village in
Sierra Leone and forced by the government to take up arms in his country's bloody civil
war.' Many like Ishmael, and some even younger, were subjected to years of brainwashing
and made witness to countless torturous acts, 2 often while kept high on drugs like mari-
juana and cocaine. 3 Funded by the illicit trade in conflict diamonds, also known as blood
diamonds, mined from the country's vast natural deposits, Sierra Leone's civil war that
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1. Andrew Gumbel, From Child Soldier to Poster Boy; Fscaping the Battle, THE INDEPFNDENT (London),
Jan. 22, 2007, at 24.
2. Stories abound of the brutality that took place in Sierra Leone during the civil war, including "mass
rape of women and children, the amputation of the limbs of men, women, children, and infants, and the
forcible recruitment of soldiers among the civilian population, including children." Amanda Bryant Banat,
Note, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed Market Theories and International Legal
Requirementsfor Certification of Origin, 19 Asuz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 939, 941 (2002).
3. Gumbel, supra note 1, at 24.
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raged during the 1990s, 4 like those of other sub-Saharan African nations, found its finan-
cial backing in the smuggling of diamonds that made their way to the corners of the
African continent and often the far ends of the world. While many of these civil wars have
abated in scale and degree, 5 conflict diamonds are still a commodity in parts of the world.
And in the eyes of many, the international regulations and protections established to curb
the illegal trade have fallen short, prompting many to call for stricter regulations, over-
sight, enforcement, and punishment for violators. 6 The tension rests in trying to balance
the positive economic contributions the diamond industry can bring to many third world
countries with the need to protect those economies and countries from the evils brought
on by the sale of illicit conflict diamonds. This comment will offer a perspective on the
conflict diamond trade through a look at the recent history of a number of African nations
and will then examine and critique various international enforcement regimes in hopes of
shedding some new light on the problem.
I. A Diamond Perspective
Martin Chungong Ayafor, the UN Chairman of the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts, said
that "diamonds are forever, it is often said. But lives are not. We must spare the people
the ordeal of war, mutilations and death for the sake of conflict diamonds." 7 Ayafor's
admonition speaks to the growing concern surrounding the plight of Africans affected by
conflict diamonds that has only recently received widespread attention.8 The UN defines
"conflict diamonds" as "diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions
opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund
military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of
the Security Council."9 Due to their small size, liquidity, great value, and fungible nature,
diamonds are highly susceptible to smuggling and illegal trade. 10 Mined in remote areas,
often with little governmental oversight at many stages of the process, diamonds "change
hands multiple times, are intermingled with other diamonds, follow circuitous trading
routes, and are accompanied by little documentation, as the trade functions more on
4. From 1991 to 1999, Sierra Leone was engaged in a bloody civil war between the government and the
Revolutionary United Front, who used diamonds to fund the sale of arms for their campaign. See Banat, supra
note 2, at 941-42.
5. Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all saw civil conflict subside in the later part of the 1990s and the
early part of the twenty-first century. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, http://www.un.org/peace/
africa/Diamond.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. It was not until 1998, when the human rights watch group and international non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO), Global Witess, broke the story of conflict diamonds and the consequent human rights viola-
tions. That same year, the United Nations Security Council placed sanctions on Angola "to prohibit the
direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the
Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN." It was the first recognition of the use of diamonds as a source of
financial support for war. S.C. Res. 1173, 1 12(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/l 173 (June 12, 1998).
9. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, supra note 5.
10. See Seth A. Malamut, Note, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley Process and
Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Repuhlic of Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 25, 27 (2005).
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honor and trust. Country data on production, import, and export rates is often fraught
with error and inconsistencies."]'
While it is estimated by some that less than 1 percent of diamonds traded on the open
market are conflict diamonds, some advocacy groups, including Global Witness, argue
that number does not represent the real situation.' 2 Global Witness "now says that con-
flict diamonds are a part of a controversial stream of stones that also includes smuggled
diamonds and diamonds mined in abusive labor situations all over the world."' 3 Accord-
ing to Global Witness, the flow of conflict diamonds is actually closer to 20 percent. 4 .
Still, given that worldwide, diamond sales in 2005 exceeded $60 billion, 15 that 1 percent, if
accurate, still represents an enormous dollar amount in unofficial, illegal transactions. Al-
though many in the western world, including the United States, do not produce rough
diamonds, countries like the United States are large traders of both polished and rough
diamonds, with it, in fact, being the "world's largest consumer market for diamond jew-
elry."16 In 2005 alone, retail diamond sales in the United Kingdom totaled £1.2 billion. 17
With nearly $8.4 billion worth of diamonds being exported from African countries,'5
maintaining the stability and fluidity of the legitimate diamond trade is important for
keeping the trade of conflict diamonds below the 1 percent estimate and out of the higher
ranges that appeared during the 1990s, 19 when the trade in conflict diamonds was esti-
mated to be valued at more than $10 billion.2 0
During the civil wars that raged in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic
of Congo near the end of the twentieth century, the trade in conflict diamonds was facili-
tated in large part by "corporate actors" who purchased diamonds "directly or indirectly
from insurgent groups." 2 1 De Beers, the largest and most influential of these corporate
actors, controls the majority of the world's diamond production and sales 22 through its
11. See Ann C. W~allis, Data Mining: Lessons fiom the Kimberley Process for the United Nations' Developnent of
Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 Nv. U. J. INT'L HUM. R-rs. 388, 390 (2005).
12. See Lynne Duke, Blood Diamonds: A River or a Droplet?, WAsh. Posr, Dec. 27, 2006, at CO.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See GlobalWitness.org. Combating Conflict Diamonds: The Diamond Industry, http://
www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the-diamond-industry.htinl.
16. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Rep. to Cong. Comms., GAO-06-978, Conflict Diamonds: Agency
Action Needed to Enhance the Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act, Sept. 27, 2006, p. 7. [hereinafter
GAO-06-978].
17. See National: FAQ Conflict Diamonds: Struggling to Shake Off a Blood-Soaked Image, GUARDIAN (London),
Jan. 22, 2007, at 9. [hereinafter FAQ Conflict Diamondsl
18. Production in African countries accounts for an estimated 65%of the world's diamonds. Diamond
production in Botswana is the largest, valued at an estimated $3.2 billion. Angola accounts for $1.5 billion
worth of production, while South Africa accounts for $1.6 billion, and the Democratic Republic of Congo
accounts for an estimated S.8 billion. See Diamondfacts.org, Fact #9, http://www.diainondfacts.org/facts/
fact._09.hnl.
19. During the heights of the civil wars in Congo, Angola, and Sierra Leone, it is estimated that conflict
diamonds made up between 4% and 15% of the global diamond trade. Officially, that number has fallen,
coinciding with relative peace in the once war-tom countries. See FAQ Conflict Diamonds, supra note 17.
20. Michael Maggi, Comment, The Currency of Terrorism: An Alteriative Way to Combat Terrorism and End
the Trade of Conflict Diamonds, 15 PACF L-I'L L. REv. 513, 518 (2003).
21. Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Genis They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading
Conflict Diamonds, 24 FOR1311AM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1427 (2001).
22. In 2001, it was estimated that De Beers controlled about 60% of the world's uncut diamonds. See id. at
1430.
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"cartel" or "producer's cooperative" structure.2 3 Until recently, it was the policy of De
Beers to buy up all available diamonds on the market to allow for price control and stabili-
zation,24 be it through its own mining activities or from external suppliers.25 De Beers
also maintains long-term contracts with countries that produce diamonds, whereby a
country will agree to sell a fixed portion of its diamonds exclusively to De Beers.26 Still,
most companies and countries producing diamonds sell their products to the London-
based Central Selling Organization (CSO), which is essentially operated by De Beers and
"is believed to buy and market roughly 80% of the world's output of rough diamonds." 27
"These diamonds are then sold at multiple annual 'sights' (sales) to 'sightholders.' The
sightholders are presented with mixed parcels of diamonds, which may include stones
from several countries. Sightholders transport the diamonds to other cities, where they
are re-sorted and repackaged for cutting and polishing or sale"28
The transparency of the CSO system, through the shear number of transactions that
occur and the middlemen that hold the product before a diamond can even get to an end
user or customer, have prompted many to accuse De Beers of buying diamonds from rebel
groups who use the proceeds to fund wars or of facilitating a system of sales that makes
tracing diamond smuggling more difficult. 29 There are widespread reports of De Beers
and other legitimate companies dealing and profiting from trade with rebel groups in war-
torn African nations. 30 Reports indicated that De Beers bought diamonds from rebels in
Angola in the 1990s and from Sierra Leone via Liberia during the same time.31 In areas
where CSO regulations are not enforced, De Beers has found ways to deal for diamonds
with rebel forces.32 In October of 1997, Gary Ralfe, De Beers' CEO, said that "[one] of
the essential jobs that we at De Beers carry out worldwide is to ensure that diamonds
coming onto the markets do not threaten the overall price structure: there is no doubt that
we buy many of those diamonds that emanate from the UNTA held areas of Angola." 33
Although De Beers has closed its offices in Sierra Leone 34 and no longer operates mines in
conflict areas,35 the nature of the transactional system established to move the stones from
mine to end user gives the impression that De Beers' system is deliberate, with an end of
making a profit regardless of who is hurt.
23. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 518.
24. De Beers has since abandoned its policy of buying up all available diamonds. See Saunders, supra note
21, at 1430-31.
25. Id. at 1428.
26. Matthew R. Dorsett, Note, Diamond's Are a Cartel's Best Friend: The Rise and Fall of Anticompetitive
Business Practices within the De Beers International Diamond Cartel, 16 IND. Lr'T'L & COMp. L. REv. 145, 154
(2005).
27. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 518.
28. Margo Kaplan, Junior Fellow's Note., Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the Diamond
Trade, 35 N.Y.U.J. LN.r'. L. & POL. 559, 581 (2003).
29. See Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First
Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MiAMI Bus. L. REv. 217, 220
(2005).
30. Id.
31. Saunders, supra note 21, at 1432-34.
32. Id.
33. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 521.
34. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 581.
35. Saunders, supra note 21, at 1431.
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H. The Bane of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa
In 1996 alone, fourteen African countries were engaged in conflict of some degree,
"accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more
than eight million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. 3 6 Behind every civil strife is
a motivation of some sort, be it political, economic, ethnic, a combination, or something
else entirely. In 2001, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank conducted a
study of seventy-eight civil conflicts occurring worldwide from 1960 to 1999 in an attempt
to develop a model that would predict the outbreak of civil conflict and war.37 They
discovered that civil rebellion was dependent on both motive and opportunity but not
necessarily in equal proportion. 38 In terms of motive, Collier and Hoeffler found that
"rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in
violent protest" or "by greed, which is presumably sufficiently common that profitable
opportunities for rebellion will not be passed up."39 In terms of opportunity, the report
noted three common sources of rebellion: "extortion of natural resources, donations from
diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments."40 But, they declared that "weak
government military capability" 4 1 and social cohesion, meaning a more homogeneous eth-
nic make-up of rebel groups and organizations, also tended to be opportunistic reasons for
civil conflict.42
While Collier and Hoeffler admit that the grievance/motive model elements have an
undeniable effect on the formation and development of rebel conflicts, they conclude that
the opportunity model is superior,43 noting that primary commodity exports, such as oil
or diamonds, are one of the most significant factors in spurring and sustaining civil con-
flict." The report found that when primary commodity exports comprised around 32
percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), the risk of conflict was at its
peak.45 At that peak, the risk of civil war rose to about 22 percent, whereas a country that
had no exports had a risk of only 1 percent. 46
As the World Bank report shows, economics is both a means and an end to civil conflict,
as the commodity can be both the motive for the conflict and the opportunity that the
conflict presents in the form of benefits reaped. 47 In essence, "rather than a continuation
of politics by other means, war may be a continuation of economics by other means ...
[Tihe end is to engage in abuses or crimes that bring immediate rewards, whereas the
'means' is the war and the perpetuation of war." 48 In the case of diamonds, an easily
36. Edward R. Fluet, Conflict Diamonds: U.S. Responsibility and Response, 7 SAN DIEGO INlT'L LJ. 103, 105
(2005).




40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 10-11.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 563-64.
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transportable and highly desirable commodity, the ease with which they can be traded and
the ever-available markets, be they legal or illegal, make the diamond producing countries
particularly susceptible to the type of economic anomaly Collier and Hoeffler describe. 4 9
During the 1990s, the civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Liberia showed that control of diamond production and the ability to dis-
tribute such a primary commodity export through various channels and pipelines was
"both a means and an end for rebel movements"5 0 and the economic backing for such
causes. By the 1990s, "the unregulated trade of diamonds had become the primary financ-
ing vehicle for rebel groups in armed conflicts in at least three African nations-Angola,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone. And a fourth, Liberia, was also
engaged in the trade in support of the Sierra Leonean rebels.1
A. SIERRA LEONE
Perhaps no war has brought the scourge of conflict diamonds before the public eye like
the diamond-funded civil war that raged in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002.52 Formerly a
British colony, Sierra Leone, since independence, has gone through a tumultuous history
of democracy and dictatorship.5 3 "Initially after independence, Sierra Leone experienced
a brief period of democratic rule. Siaka Stevens, representing the All People's Congress
was elected prime minister in 1967, and he established a one party state in 1978. In 1985,
Stevens handed power over to his chosen successor, Major General Joseph Saidu
Momoh."5 4 Once a country full of great promise,55 Sierra Leone fell victim to problems
of resource depletion, corruption, debt, inflation, currency devaluation, and food and en-
ergy crises, among others.5 6 In a 1991 campaign to oust then-President Joseph Momoh,
the insurgent group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, began the
civil war that would eventually leave more than 2 million people displaced, 20,000 ab-
ducted, and 75,000 killed.5 7
Claiming to be fighting for justice for the people and against the corruption of the
government, the RUF won initial support from a tired and politically distrustful popula-
tion that saw the group as "a heroic army that would fight for a multi-party government
and equitable wealth distribution."5 8 Allegedly motivated by "systematic government cor-
ruption leading to the failure to attend to the needs of the citizens" and "conflicting ideas
about who should control the State's mineral resources,"5 9 it quickly became clear that the
49. Id.
50. See id. at 565.
51. Wallis, supra note 11, at 390-91.
52. See Malamut, supra note 10, at 30-3 1.
53. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 1423-24.
54. Id.
55. It is reported that Sierra Leone was home to world's most prosperous diamond mines. See Malamut,
supra note 10, at 31. The country also had a strong university and highly skilled civil servants. See Kaplan,
supra note 28, at 570.
56. See Banat, supra note 2, at 942.
57. Laura Forest, Note, Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establisbing a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending
Rebel Control Over the Country's Diamond Resources, 11 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 633, 537-38 (2001).
58. Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality
Debate, 12 MINh'N. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13 (2003).
59. See Banat, supra note 2, at 941.
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RUT' had no such lofty ideals, much less any "credible political demands. '60 The rebellion
began with rebel forces entering Sierra Leone from Liberia to the south,6' taking control
of the alluvial diamond fields of the eastern Sierra Leone Kono region and using the
mines as ransom against the government and for financing its own guerilla campaigns. 62
In fact, many RU soldiers were diamond miners and traders before taking up arms with
the rebel group. 63 In a perfect example of Collier and Hoeffler's thesis, the RUF rebels
were never motivated by the ideals of anti-corruption and wealth distribution they suppos-
edly espoused but were instead driven to take over the diamond-rich areas of the country
as a means of fueling the war economy and making a profit for themselves. 64 At one time
during the civil war, the RUF controlled nine-tenths of the country's diamond mines, 65
generating between $25 and $125 million annually in diamond sales. 66
Sierra Leone's diamond trade is a telling history of corruption and misplaced potential.
Since diamonds were first discovered in Sierra Leone in the 1930s, the country has been
known as an exporter of high quality diamonds.67 Diamonds from Sierra Leone are octa-
hedral, making them very rare and very valuable. 68 From 1930 to 1998, Sierra Leone
officially mined 55 million carats of diamonds, and in 1996, the average price per carat was
$267.69 Yet as an official exporter of rough diamonds, Sierra Leone's reputation is not as
sound. "From a high of over two million carats in 1970, legitimate diamond exports
dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and then only to 48,000 in 1988. The Bank of Sierra
Leone... reported that revenue from diamond exports totaling US $20,600,000 in 1991,
fell to US $800,000 by 1995."70
The RUF's access to and control over such an enormous source of wealth and war-
financing demonstrates the "brutal conflict where diamonds are but one of many re-
sources sustaining war and where resources are but one of many sources of conflict."
7 1
Yet, the illicit diamond trade that funded and provided for the weapons and recruiting for
Sierra Leone's civil war took effect not only on the macroeconomic strength of the coun-
try but also on the human toll in the form of countless atrocities of war. 72 The RUF was
known for using violent tactics, targeting children and civilians with such acts as burning
them alive or hacking off limbs with machetes. 73 With tactics that amounted to "tectonic
60. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 569.
61. See Banat, supra note 2, at 943.
62. The Kono region was not only the targeted objective, but also the center of the fighting between the
RUF and the military. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 567-68.
63. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 1426.
64. See Kaplan, spra note 28, at 567-68.
65. See Forest, supra note 57, at 634.
66. See Malamut, supra note 10, at 31.
67. See Forest, supra note 57, at 640-41.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 641.
71. Kaplan, svpra note 28, at 566.
72. In the eyes of Fluet, "[t]he movement of conflict diamonds has created some of the most serious human
rights issues of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries." See Fluet, supra note 36, at 105. It is estimated that
the "{t]rade of diamonds for weapons has resulted in six million war-related fatalities in Africa over the last
fifty years, mostly by small arms and light weapons." Id. at 107.
73. In an attempt to prove that "people without hands could not vote against the RUF," the RUF mutilated
over 20,000. See Price, svpra note 58, at 12; see also Fluet, supra note 36, at 106; Kaplan, sutpra note 28, at 571.
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population shifts away from the diamond areas," 74 the RUF's campaign of violence
granted them further control over the diamond-rich areas while contributing to the coun-
try's instability.75 "With no alternative source of money in a failed state, the profits gained
from mining and pillaging gave the RUTF and the often complicit military little incentive
to take the peace process seriously, or even to attempt to win the war." 76 With so much
money coming in from the illicit diamond trade, the economics of the situation only make
the war seem logical in the eyes of the RUF. 7 7 It was only after a global response from
humanitarian organizations78 that the world and the UN intervened. 79 In May of 1999,
the RUF and Sierra Leone signed the Lome Peace Accord, a cease-fire agreement that
gave Sankoh the title of Chairman of the Commission on the Management of Strategic
Resources.8 0 The agreement seemed tentative, at best. With the title of Chairman,
Sankoh would "officially have control over the diamond mines that his forces were already
controlling."8' The agreement also left many uneasy, as it granted amnesty to rebel fight-
ers. Violence continued for a time after the signing, and the diamond channels were still
open.8 2 The UN passed Resolution 1306 in July of 2000,83 imposing a ban on all imports
of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone except those certified by the government. The UN
Resolution dictated that "all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct
or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory."8 4 The
Resolution also requests the "Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of ur-
gency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation
in Sierra Leone."85 The agreement, however, failed initially when the RUTF took a num-
ber of UN soldiers hostage.86 Six months after the Lome Agreement was established,
troops from the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which had fought the RUT
alongside the government army, were attacked by the RUTF.87 Five-hundred UN soldiers
were taken hostage, but they were released or rescued by British forces between May and
September of 2000.8 Yet in January of 2002, the disarmament of Sierra Leone was com-
pleted, and elections were held the following May.8 9 Although technically there should
not have been anymore conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, the trade of illicit diamonds
continued to threaten national and regional stability. 90
74. Fluet, supra note 36, at 106.
75. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 569.
76. Id. at 568.
77. Malamut, svtpra note 10, at 31.
78. See sypra note 8 and accompanying text.
79. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 571.
80. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 1425.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. S.C. Res. 1306, TT 1, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Price, rupra note 58, at 12-15.
87. Id. at 14-15
88. Id.
89. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 572.
90. Id.
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B. LIBERIA
The RUF in Sierra Leone was fueled not only by the trade in conflict diamonds but also
by support from a cadre of foreign nations who saw a chance at profit.91 Countries such as
the Ukraine, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Liberia have all been accused in the past by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of aiding RUF rebels with the
aim of exploiting Sierra Leone's diamond industry. 92 Of these states, none was more
complicit in the trafficking and smuggling of diamonds out of Sierra Leone than neigh-
boring Liberia. 93 In addition to providing the RUF a launching platform from which to
ignite its war, 94 Liberia was a conduit to the outside world for conflict diamonds from
Sierra Leone. Former Liberian President Charles Taylor "reportedly assisted in the oper-
ations of the RUE" by recruiting citizens of Sierra Leone for the rebel forces, and by
supplying their efforts with arms in exchange for smuggled diamonds." 95 Liberia, during
the civil war in Sierra Leone, "has been the principle route for smuggling of Sierra Le-
onean diamonds on to the world markets, a refuge for RUF fighters, a diplomatic sup-
porter of the RUF, and an alleged transit point for arms shipments." 96 These smuggled
diamonds were then exported to Antwerp to be part of the CSO process, but the sheer
number of diamonds that left Liberia raised the eyebrows of many who saw a discrepancy
in actual Liberian diamond production versus capability of production.97 "While the an-
nual Liberian diamond mining capacity [was] between 100,000 and 150,000 carats, rough
diamond imports to Antwerp from Liberia were recorded at 31 million carats between
1994 and 1998-an average of over 6 million carats per year."' s After the UN passed
Resolution 1306 and banned all sales of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, diamond
production in Liberia increased 162.1 percent over 1999 production. 99 In 2001, diamond
production in Liberia increased over 75 percent in the first quarter alone. 1°°
The increased output caught the attention of the UN, who noted that diamonds "re-
present a major and primary source of income for the [RUF], that the bulk of RUF
diamonds leave Sierra Leone through Liberia, and that such illicit trade cannot be con-
ducted without the permission and involvement of Liberian government officials at the
highest levels." 1°1 The Resolution called for a ban on all imports of diamonds from Sierra
Leone, regardless of whether those diamonds originated in Sierra Leone, except for those
"controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra Le-
one."
10 2 With the obvious intention of curbing the illicit trade and smuggling of Sierra
Leonean conflict diamonds through neighboring Liberia, the UN reiterated its desire "to
break the link between diamonds and armed conflict" and to target "the link between the
91. See Banat, supra note 2, at 943.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The RUF entered Sierra Leone and launched its offensive by going through Liberia. See supra note 53
and accompanying text.
95. Banat, sypra note 2, at 943.
96. See Forest, supra note 57, at 642.




101. See S.C. Res 1343, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (March 7, 2001).
102. Id. at T2(c).
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trade in conflict diamonds and the supply to rebel movements of weapons, fuel or other
prohibited material." 10 3
C. ANGOLA
Like Sierra Leone, the role of conflict diamonds in Angola's history stems from
problems rooted in the country's colonial history.' 0 4 A Portuguese colony since explorers
first arrived there in 1483,105 Angola was an essential part of the Portuguese empire and
economy, initially because of its export of slaves and later because of its trade in, and
supply of, coffee, oil, and diamonds.10 6 The exploitation of Angolan resources and people,
however, left many Angolans uneasy with their colonial rulers, and it ushered in national-
ist movements that would form the basis of civil conflict in post-colonial Angola.'0 7 Dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, three nationalist movements emerged in response to the growing
anti-colonialist sentiment, each with its own political philosophy and idea of how Angola
should be run.' 08 The ruling party in Angola, the Popular Movement for Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), was founded in 1956 and "drew support from urban dwellers and pro-
fessed a Marxist ideology." 10 9 The National Front of Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was
"composed mostly of Kikongo, or Bakongo, people who had significant ties to Zaire,"
while the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), founded by
Jonas Savimbi in 1966,110 drew support from the Ovimbundu people, the largest ethnic
group in Angola and the group residing in the diamond producing areas of Angola."'
UNITA's ideology was largely Savimbi's own ideals and personal political vision, which
began as Maoist and evolved into anti-communist." 2 Many saw this move as an attempt
to win the support and assistance of the United States during the Cold War.
113
Although the groups shared a common vision of an Angola freed from colonialist rule,
the three groups differed greatly in their theories as to the means to accomplish that
goal. 14 When the MPLA gained control of the capital city, Luanda, after Portugal abdi-
cated control and granted independence to Angola in 1975, UNITA and FNLA came
together to launch a civil war against the MPLA-run government.11 5 Acknowledging that
they could not defeat the ruling power alone, the two nationalist groups agreed to come
together under the banner of UNITA and launch a civil war. 116 The civil war caught the
attention of both the United States and the Soviet Union, who were vying for political
influence in the Third World and saw the African continent as just another battlefield in
103. Id. at 1.
104. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
105. Saunders, supra note 21, at 1417.
106. See Maggi, sitpra note 20, at 522.
107. Id.
108. The three groups were distinct in their politics but also in their popular bases of support. See Saunders,
spra note 21, at 1416-17.
109. Id. at 1418.
110. See id. at 1417-18.
111. Id. at 1420.
112. Id.
113. Maggi, supra note 20, at 523.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 523-24.
116. Id.
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the Cold War.I1 7 With support coming in from both sides, there was no need to exploit
the country's natural resources beyond simple supply and demand trade. Yet as the Cold
War drew to a close, support from the East and the West dried up, which forced UNITA
"to sell its stockpiles of diamonds to supply its army with weapons.""18
After a May 1991 peace agreement that resulted in a cease-fire and lead to free elections
in September of the next year," 9 UNITA and MPLA again were engaged in war. With
repeated attempts at peace,' 20 Angola spent the next ten years in and out of peace and
cease-fires. Established peace arose only recently after Savimbi's death in February 2002
and the Luena Memorandum was signed, leading to a relatively lasting period of peace,
cease-fire, and free elections in Angola.1 21 Yet, the relative peace that exists now did not
come without a cost, as it is estimated that due to the violence that erupted between
UNITA and MPLA during the 1990s, hundreds of thousands were killed or displaced,
with 182,000 killed between May and October of 1993 alone.' 22 During this time, the
diamoihd trade and the diamond mines controlled by UNITA allowed the rebel group to
finance and continue their war, with revenue from illicit sales estimated to be nearly $4
billion between 1992 and 1998.123 Looking to Collier and Hoeffler's thesis, diamonds,
again, may have been more than a source of funding and, perhaps, even the "goal of the
conflict." 124 "Two of UNITA's major wars were launched at a time of significant recession
in the diamond industry, and during the 1997 recession, UNITA withdrew from the
Cuango Valley mines, cutting back supplies in an overstocked industry."125 During the
fighting, UNITA attempted to shut down official diamond mining in an attempt to pre-
vent the government from profiting from the diamond trade. 126 Utilizing tax havens and
an elaborate system of transport between small traders, mining companies, and "relief
agencies," UNITA was able to trade diamonds overseas and throughout the African conti-
nent while avoiding UN oversight and concealing their origin.127 Reports indicate that
UNITA sold diamonds to a "smaller diamond trader, who buys African diamonds from a
range of countries and who is in contact with UNITA's diamond traders. The trader is
the agent of a larger diamond cutter, and these diamonds are moved via tax havens from
the first trader to the second." 128 The system is designed to conceal that the diamonds
117. In line with the "containment policy" and its mission to quash communism, the United States pledged
its support for the democratic leaning UNITA, while the Soviet Union lent its support to the Marxist-leaning
Angolan government under MPLA. See Malamut, supra note 10, at 30; see also Maggi, slpra note 20, at 524.
118. See Malamut, supra note 10, at 30.
119. The U.N. ruled free and fair the 1992 elections which won the MPLA control of the government, but
Savimbi rejected the results and fighting continued. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 524.
120. In 1994, UNITA and the MPLA signed the Lusaka Protocol in an attempt to end the fighting, but the
peace was tentative at best. UN1TA breached the Protocol and Savimbi took the opportunity to undergo a
rearmament. In a 1999 government offensive, UNITA lost control of key diamond mining areas in Angola.
See Kaplan, snpra note 28, at 573-74.
121. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 525. UNITA converted into a political party in 2003, electing leaders to
run in general elections. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 574.
122. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 573.
123. See Malanut, supra note 10, at 30. During this time, "diamond output was under near-exclusive control
of UNITA." See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 574.
124. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 574.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 525-26.
128. Id. at 525.
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originated in Angola. UN reports also indicate that "UNITA was able to maintain fund-
ing through various 'relief agencies' in Africa and Europe. These 'relief agencies' would
publicly solicit funds to end the violence in Angola, but would actually act as a front and
solicit funds for the war effort."129
For its "failure to implement fully its obligations contained in the Lusaka Protocol,
[and] relevant Security Council resolutions," the UN, in passing Security Council Resolu-
tion 1173, condemned 130 UNITA and levied sanctions, including dictating that states
"prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory.., all diamonds that
are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime."' 31 While the volume of
conflict diamonds reaching the market did decrease after sanctions were levied, some see
the end of armed conflict as the motivating factor in curbing the illicit practice. 32 It was
not until the assassination of Savimbi and the signing of Luena Memorandum that peace
was ushered into Angola and the trade in conflict diamonds noticeably receded. "Since its
signing, the Luena Memorandum has served as the foundation that the new Angolan gov-
ernment has used to help draft a constitution and legitimize its authority."133 The civil
conflict in Angola shows that sanctions were most effective when coinciding with peace,
suggesting that cooperation among the international community and a lack of incentive to
profit illegally went a long way toward stabilization.134
D. DrMocRATIc REPUBLIC OF CONGO
One of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources, 3 the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was also the centerpiece in what has been called
"Africa's First World War."' 36 When the Congo gained independence in 1960, after sixty
years of Belgian colonialist rule, it saw five turbulent years before rebel leader Joseph
Mobutu came to power after a coup d'etat.137 While many thought that the vast natural
resources would bring prosperity to the Congo following independence, such predictions
or hopes turned out to be false, as the resources instead became a source of conflict. 38
Mobutu renamed the country Zaire and ran it as a military dictatorship but "[flailed for-
eign investnents, cancelled development programs, and riots by unpaid soldiers character-
ized his thirty-year reign."' 39 During his reign, Mobutu made a number of changes to his
trade policies, including ending an exclusive contract between his country and a De Beers
subsidiary. 14 In the early 1980s, Mobutu
129. Id. at 526.
130. S.C. Res. 1173, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 June 12, 1998).
131. Id. at I 12(b).
132. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 529.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The DRC has a natural abundance of diamonds, gold, cobalt, copper, timber, and coltan, an ore used in
the aerospace industry and in the production of electronics capacitors. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 578.
136. See Price, supra note 58, at 16.
137. See Fishman, supra note 29, at 221.
138. Id.
139. Price, supra note 58, at 18.
140. See Fishman, supra note 29, at 221.
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abruptly ended an exclusive contract between Zaire and a subsidiary of De Beers in
order to exploit [Zaire's] diamond resources through more lucrative deals. Regard-
less of the actual intent behind this change, the sudden removal of De Beers from
Zaire's diamond industry drastically undercut the stability of the diamond market. 141
The move showed just how vital diamonds were to the economy of the country.
The UN attempted to establish peace when Mobutu's reign ended after continued con-
flict between rebels and his government soldiers, 42 but rebels, led by Laurent-Desire
Kabila, captured eastern Zaire and took control of the government and country. 43 After
capturing eastern Zaire and the capital, Kinshasa, Kabila named himself president and
changed the country's name back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.-" "In an
effort to improve the economy, Kabila entered into a new agreement with Rwanda and
Uganda to exploit the DRC's natural resources through an intricate network of mining
companies and financial institutions." 145 The arraignment did not last, and neither did
the peace; soon after, the rebellion turned into a civil war that eventually brought some
seven African nations into conflict with one another. 146 In 1998, Tutsi rebels supported by
Rwandan and Ugandan forces attempted to overthrow the government in an uprising that
eventually brought troops from Zimbabwe, Chad, Namibia, Angola, and Burundi into the
conflict in the DRC.147 Not only was the uprising supported "by trading rough diamonds
for arms and money"148 but also "[t]he geographical proximity of Rwanda and Uganda
allowed their soldiers to enter and occupy the bordering regions, and to establish their
own diamond extraction networks within the DRC." 149 Like Sierra Leone, Angola, and
Liberia before it, the civil strife in the DRC showed a clear connection between the con-
flict and economic opportunity in the form of exploited resources. 5 0
E. STATELESS ENEMIES
While the trade in conflict diamonds has surely left its mark on the African continent,
the effects of the trade are felt elsewhere around the globe, particularly in nations that
have fallen victim to terrorist attacks by stateless organizations such as al Qaeda.' 5 1 In the
wake of 9/11, reports surfaced of the group's use of "conflict diamonds for financing and
money laundering." 52 From as far back as the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the
141. Id.
142. The United Nations peace plan called for "(1) the cessation of hostilities; (2) the withdrawal of all
external forces; (3) the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire; (4) the protection of
all refugees and displaced persons; and (5) the rapid and peaceful settlement of the conflict through dialogue,
the electoral process, and an international conference on peace in the region." See S.C. Res. 1097, J 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1097 (Feb. 18, 1997); Fishman, svpra note 29, at 221-22.
143. Fishman, supra note 29, at 222.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Malamut, supra note 1, at 32.
147. Id.
148. See Fishman, supra note 29, at 222.
149. Malamut, supra note 10, at 32.
150. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 578.
151. Id. at 617, nl.
152. Fluet, supra note 36, at 107. The Washington Post reported that al Qaeda bought diamonds from
Sierra Leonean rebels and sold them in Europe for millions of dollars. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 122.
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group had attempted to evade U.S. attempts to freeze al Qaeda and Taliban bank accounts
by converting their cash into a more liquid, fungible, and untraceable asset.' 5 3 Investiga-
tions by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) into al Qaeda-lined diamond
merchants showed large surges in business in diamonds prior to 9/11,154 indicating that
the conflict diamond trade "channels billions of dollars into black market economies turn-
ing it into easy money for terrorists whose cells are involved in a range of money making
activities that include diamond trading."'155 Other terrorist groups, such as Hamas and
Hezbollah, have also bought African diamonds and sold them outside the continent, mak-
ing a large profit and using it to buy arms.156 Hezbollah, specifically, "has funneled mil-
lions of dollars through the DRC to its organization." I5 7 The ability of international
terrorists to utilize a commodity such as conflict diamonds has awoken many in Europe
and the West to the reality that the conflict diamond trade is not just Africa's problem, but
is a far-reaching problem, even if many of the other conflicts in Africa have subsided.' 5 8
M. An International Response-Diamond Certification and the Kimberley
Process
A. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
In response to UN sanctions, many African countries established internal mechanisms
and certification systems aimed at controlling the trade of smuggled and illicit conflict
diamonds; but without effective enforcement, these internal schemes had little real ef-
fect.' 59 In hopes of making these enforcement regimes more effective and creating a
"stronger multilateral effort to proscribe illicit trading," 160 Africa's diamond producing
nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and members of the diamond industry
met in Kimberley, South Africa, 16 1 in May 2000 to "establish normative trade standards to
prevent the conflict diamond trade" 162 and to "discuss the development of an international
certification scheme aimed at preventing 'conflict diamonds from entering legitimate mar-
kets." 1 63 The UN, in its General Assembly Resolution adopted in January 2001, gave its
official recognition of the conflict diamond problem and offered its support and backing
for an international diamond certification scheme.' 64 Specifically, the UN acknowledged
"that the problem of conflict diamonds is of serious international concern, and that mea-
153. See Maggi, svpra note 20, at 536. Converting their cash to diamonds allowed al Qaeda "to hold several
million dollars of assets in 'the most compact form of wealth known to man."' See Fluet, supra note 36, at
108.
154. Before being apprehended by Belgian authorities, Aziz Nassour, an al Qaeda operative and Lebanese
diamond merchant, saw his diamond company see a surge in business of over $1 billion prior to 9/11. See
Maggi, supra note 20, at 536.
155. Id. at 536-37.
156. Fluet, supra note 36, at 108.
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159. See Malamut, supra note 10, at 38-39.
160. Banat, supra note 2, at 957.
161. Kimberley, South Africa, is the site of De Beers' first mine. See id.
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sures to address the problem should involve all concerned parties, including producing,
processing, exporting, and importing countries, as well as the diamond industry." 65 The
Resolution
[emphasized] that these measures should be effective and pragmatic, consistent with
international law, including relevant trade provisions and commitments, and should
not impede the current legitimate trade in diamonds or impose an undue burden on
Governments or industry, particularly smaller producers, and not hinder the develop-
ment of the diamond industry.166
The meeting of diamond producing nations and NGOs led to the creation of the "Kim-
berley Process," "a program of voluntary negotiation among state governments to build an
international Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for the import and export of rough
diamonds."1 67 In 2002, two years after negotiations began, the participating members'
work resulted in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which built off of
existing UN sanctions and regulations.1 68 The primary goal of the Kimberley Process is
to "legitimize the governments that rely on the trade of diamonds by setting forth a regu-
lated import and export system that will attempt to stabilize the trade of diamonds in these
African countries."1 69 Once a stable government is in place, "it is believed that those who
have been severely affected by the ongoing conflicts funded by the trade in rough
diamonds will be eliminated."170
The KPCS began in November of 2003 when fifty-two governments ratified and
adopted the agreement.'17 Today, seventy-one governments, with the support of the dia-
mond industry and various NGOs, are participating members of the KPCS.172 The
KPCS participants receive "reports and recommendations from the World Diamond
Council in order to develop a comprehensive method to stem the flow of conflict
diamonds while minimizing the impact on legitimate trade." 173 The Kimberley Process
consists of three basic components: an internal control system, requirements for shipping
rough diamonds, and a method of tracking diamonds after export."74 The Kimberley Pro-
cess dictates that diamonds follow an established path and go through a system of security
measures before reaching the end user. 175 After rough diamonds are mined, they are sent
to Government Diamond Offices, where they are certified as "conflict free."1 76 The
diamonds are then placed in tamper-resistant containers and accompanied by a govern-
ment-issued Kimberley Process Certificate bearing an individual serial number.' 77 In ad-
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 56/263, $T 9-11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/263 (Feb. 6, 2003).
167. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 587.
168. See Fluet, supra note 36, at 111.
169. Maggi, supra note 20, at 530.
170. Id.
171. Diamondfacts.org, Eliminating Conflict Diamonds, http://diamondfacts.org/conflict/eliminating-con-
flictdiamonds.hnml#kim (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
172. See id.
173. See Fluet, supra note 36, at 111-12.
174. See Kaplan, spra note 28, 587.
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dition to be being forgery resistant, the certificate must identify the country of the
diamond's origin, and it must include a "unique tracking number, dates of issuance and
expiration, the issuing authority, the identity of the exporter or importer, carat weight, the
United States dollar value, and a description of the shipment's contents." 178 Each partici-
pant nation is required to ensure that the diamonds being legally imported come only
from one of the other seventy-one KPCS member-states. 179 Diamond shipments lacking
the Kimberley Process Certificate are subject to impound or rejection.180 Kimberley Pro-
cess participants
through whose territory rough diamond shipments pass are not required to meet [the
importing requirements], provided that the authorities of that territory ensure that
the shipment leaves the territory in a state identical to that when it entered (the
shipment may not be opened or tampered with in any way).' 18
Those diamonds entering legitimately and in compliance with KPCS requirements are
sent out to be cut, but each time a diamond changes hands, it must be accompanied by a
warranty verifying that the diamond is not from a conflict region. 8 2 This warranty sys-
tem is required of diamond traders at almost every stage in the process, from "rough
diamond importers to in-country traders, polishers, dealers, and manufacturers."18 3 The
affirmative statement accompanying the warranty dictates that "[t]he diamonds herein in-
voiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and
in compliance with UN resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are
conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the sup-
plier of these diamonds." 1s4 "Under the terms of the Kimberley Process, it will be consid-
ered a violation to issue a warranty declaration on a sales invoice unless it can be
corroborated by warranty invoices received for purchases." 85 If a country does not com-
ply with the Kimberley Process principles and guidelines, including the warranty provi-
sions, that country could be made subject to an investigation or face expulsion from
certain diamond industry institutions.'8 6 The Kimberley Process also calls for coopera-
tion requirements among its participants, providing that "[p]articipants should provide
each other with information to assist the operation of the controls, such as the identifica-
tion of the authorities in each state who are responsible for implementing the certification
scheme and relevant laws." 18 7 The process also provides for monitoring and dispute reso-
lution procedures whereby "[r]eview missions must be conducted with the consent of the
Participant concerned."'88 In addition to the KPCS, many diamond industry organiza-
tions and affiliate groups adopted a system of self-regulation.' 8 9
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B. U.S. EFFORTS TO HALT THE TRADE IN CONFLICT DIAMONDS
Ranking as the world's largest market for diamonds and its leading consumer, the
United States was in the unique position to assume responsibility and act against the traf-
ficking of conflict diamonds.190 "[D]emand for diamonds in the United States is the larg-
est in the world." 191 "In fiscal year 2000, over $800 million in rough diamonds entered
the United States from fifty-three countries through several U.S. ports of entry. These
imports contribute significantly to the U.S. diamond jewelry market, which was worth an
estimated $26 billion in 2000."192 Aside from any moral obligation to curb human rights
violations or civil unrest,
the United States recognized that without its participation in the quest to eliminate
trade in conflict diamonds, world trade in legitimate diamonds would face the threat
of consumer backlash. If the United States did not participate in the KPCS, the
world's largest consumer of diamonds would face isolation from the non-conflict dia-
mond-trading world) 93
If the United States did not become a participating member of the KPCS, its diamond
trade would be limited to other non-participating members, which, for all intent and pur-
pose, would be diamond-producing nations already facing UN sanctions for diamond-
trade violations or failure to comply with KPCS requirements. 194 The result of not be-
coming a member would also be that legitimate diamond-exporting countries would lose
the benefit of U.S. markets and revenues. 195
Acknowledging the link to supporting the legitimate diamond trade and acting to cut
off terrorist financing,196 the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed the Clean
Diamond Trade Act (CDTA or the "Act") on April 25, 2003.197 OnJuly 30, 2003, one day
before the deadline passed for authorizing the certification process, President Bush signed
the Act.198 The Act was sponsored by Congressman Tony Hall. Hall, an Ohio Democrat,
has made a mission out of addressing humanitarian causes, including the eradication of
conflict diamonds. 199
A born again Christian and Peace Corps volunteer in the 1960s, Hall had long shown
a profound commitment to the fight against world hunger. In 1993, he protested
Congress' decision to abolish its Select Committee on Hunger with a three-week
hunger strike. Oxfam, the international humanitarian group, honored him in
1992.200
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The Act concludes that "[flunds derived from the sale of rough diamonds are being used
by rebels and state actors to finance military activities, overthrow legitimate governments,
subvert international efforts to promote peace and stability, and commit horrifying atroci-
ties against unarmed civilians." 201 Not only does the Act acknowledge the "consumer
backlash" of not complying with the KPCS,202 but it also provides "[m]easures for the
importation and exportation of rough diamonds." 203
The CDTA gives the President authority to "prohibit the importation into, or exporta-
tion from, the United States of any rough diamond, from whatever source, that has not
been controlled through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme." 20 4 This require-
ment can be waived if the President determines that a country is taking steps to implement
the KPCS or if the interests of national security predominate.2 05 "[T]he CDTA permits
the President to prohibit or seize diamond and jewelry shipments if the traders violate or
attempt to violate provisions of the CDTA."206 Both civil and criminal penalties can be
levied against violators of the Act,20 7 although as of 2005, "[n]o individual, however, has
been tried or convicted in the United States for attempting, or actually importing or ex-
porting, uncertified diamonds." 208
IV. What's Wrong with the System?
A. THE FALLACY OF THE CDTA
The CDTA also contains provisions setting forth monitoring and recording measures
for "annual reviews" of procedures "for the exportation from the United States of rough
diamonds to determine whether such standards, practices, and procedures are in accor-
dance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme." 209 The results of a current re-
port from the Government Accountability Office (GAO),210 conducted as required by the
CDTA,211 highlight certain problems and deficiencies with the contemporary enforce-
ment scheme. The report made a number of observations on the current state of diamond
importing and exporting in the United States and found that in many instances effective
enforcement of KPCS procedures was below-par. 2 12
201. § 3901(2)(1).
202. § 3901(2)(6)-(7). "Without effective action to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds," the Act concludes,
"the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the threat of a consumer backlash that could damage the economies of
countries not involved in the trade of conflict diamonds and penalize members of the legitimate trade and
people they employ." The Act also singles out Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania as African
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The GAO report found, among other things, that while U.S. authorities have moved
closer to implementing the CDTA's importing and trade provisions, the United States was
still vulnerable to illicit trade. 2 13 "Because most of these vulnerabilities involve limited
government monitoring and oversight, U.S. control systems cannot help deter illicit
rough diamonds from entering the legitimate trade."21 4 Furthermore, the report finds
that U.S. trade data on rough diamond imports leaves much work to be done.2 15 As the
KPCS has expressed growing concern over the reliability of data submitted by the United
States, the report noted that U.S. rough diamond trade data submitted to the KPCS indi-
cated a significantly higher volume of diamond imports than exports.2 16 Specifically, the
GAO report stated "that the United States had exported about 3 million carats more than
it imported in 2003. As a non-producing nation, this excess in exports was not plausible
and raised concerns about the accuracy of the U.S. trade data and the potential laundering
of rough diamonds through the United States."2 17
In addition to inaccurate reporting on importing and exporting data, the GAO also
found weaknesses in the imported rough diamond inspection plan. 218 U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), which handles the inspection of diamond import shipments for
documentation review, uses a system of inspection that seeks to identify "high-risk" ship-
ments for physical inspection, but the selection is random, and "[l]ess than one percent of
rough diamond shipments each year are selected for a physical inspection through this
program." 2 19 Not only are a scant number of imported diamonds physically inspected,
but the "CBP does not have a policy or plan for conducting physical inspections periodi-
cally or regularly."220 The report also found that "[t]he United States has not fully com-
plied with the KPCS standard that requires KPCS participants to confirm rough diamond
import receipts to the relevant foreign exporting authority." 22 1 The report concludes that
"the United States had not confirmed receipt of most import shipments to foreign export-
ing authorities of four KPCS participants, which are key U.S. trading partners, and the
United States did not know the extent to which it had not confirmed import receipts with
the rest of the participants." 222 The report also cites a lack of vigilance with regards to
tracking these receipts. 223 According to the report, "[tihe United States has not made any
U.S. agency responsible for tracking these import confirmations, and has only learned
about the U.S. failure to confirm import receipts when exporting authorities from other
countries have complained about this problem." 224 Further still, weaknesses are exposed
in the system to control rough diamonds, as the current system "involves little direct U.S.
government monitoring, thereby preventing the United States from being sure that illicit
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216. Id. at 13-14.
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shipments are not leaving the country."225 This lack of oversight may have spilled over to
the certificates themselves, as "[s]ome countries have reported quality control problems
with the U.S. Kimberley Process certificates. ' 226 Reported problems include certificates
with corrections (including the use of correction fluid), typographical errors, and incorrect
dates.2 27 The quality control problems are a concern for many not only for formality
issues, but because they raise the possibility that the certificates have been tampered with
and are therefore not in compliance with KPCS requirements.2 28
B. WHY THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS MAY NOT BE WORKING
The observations made in the GAO report about the shortcomings of the CDTA echo
many of the criticisms levied by NGOs and academics on the Kimberley Process itself,
including deficient monitoring and lack of enforcement.229 Global Witness notes that "
[t]here is still a flourishing illicit trade in diamonds globally," even years after the Kimber-
ley Process has been implemented. 230 But to some, the continuing flow of conflict
diamonds will not be stopped even by a fully implemented Kimberley Process.231 Seeing
as diamonds are among the "most concentrated forms of wealth and offer huge returns
due to their price and ease which they can be smuggled," there is no guarantee that any
type or degree of certification scheme would stop already-determined smugglers or dia-
mond mining officials who continue to be "amenable to bribery."232 Yet if the goal of the
Kimberley Process is to stop the trade in conflict diamonds, a necessary first step is clearly
and effectively defining a "conflict diamond" to distinguish it from other diamonds, but
conflicting or inconsistent definitions among documents and organizations may present
problems in effective enforcement.233
The UN defines conflict diamonds as "diamonds that originate from areas controlled
by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments,
and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contraven-
tion of the decisions of the Security Council."234 UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56
defines conflict diamonds as "rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to
finance their military activities, including attempts to overthrow legitimate Govern-
ments."235 The Kimberley Process working document defines conflict diamonds in a
more expansive way, as
rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at
undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant UN Security Council
(UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or other similar UNSC resolu-
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232. Id.
233. See Kaplan, at 594-95.
234. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, supra, note 5.
235. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 161, 2.
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tions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognized in
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar
UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in the future.23 6
While these definitions are consistent in their reference to diamonds that fund rebel
movements and diamonds classified by UN Security Council resolutions, they do not take
into account that labels such as "rebel movement" or "factions opposed to legitimate and
internationally recognized governments" can be ambiguous or even counter-produc-
tive.2 37 "Furthermore, conflicts may arise in which the Security Council, due to either
political circumstance or to other reasons, does not issue a resolution with regard to the
conflict."238
One of the most common criticisms of the KPCS is that its system of internal controls
is voluntary in nature. 239 Although the Kimberly Process requires participants to "amend
or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification
Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions, the doc-
ument provides little enlightenment as to what constitutes appropriate laws. 240 Without
clear definitions of what these standards and laws are meant to be, the Kimberley Process
becomes "reliant on the good faith of participating countries"241 and "is only as strong as
the will of the Participants to execute it."242 Given the nature of political stability in
certain of these diamond-producing countries, especially during times of civil unrest, self-
regulation as a policy for enforcement should give reason to question the strength of the
KPCS.243 For example, the system established in Angola some years ago provides "no
guarantee that the nation's internal controls prevent diamonds from being imported or
exported illegally. ,244 Without an established system for determining, "beyond an incom-
plete paper system," where diamonds originate or enter the stream of trade, there is an
inherent danger that "self-regulation only amounts to a statement on an invoice that is not
verifiable and is not supported by any policies that prevent the purchase of conflict
diamonds." 245
Still, even if the good faith of KPCS participants in promoting internal controls led to a
reduction in the trafficking of conflict diamonds, such actions may have come about too
late. Global Witness first brought conflict diamonds to the world's attention in 1998, but
the Kimberley Process was not fully in place until July 2003, when many of the human
rights violations had subsided with the end of civil conflicts and when the time for the
greatest impact on saving lives had passed.2 46 The lapse between the conflicts that fueled
236. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 594.
237. Existing definitions "may not account adequately for the variety of conflicts that diamonds fuel." See id.
at 595.
238. Id.
239. See Wallis, supra note 11, at 405.
240. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 591.
241. Fluet, supra note 36, at 116.
242. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 591.
243. See Fluet, supra note 36, at 117.
244. Id.
245. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
246. "It simply took too long for the world community to react to the failed UN sanctions, and even after
the Kimberley Process was underway, discord and disagreement caused significant delays in its implementa-
tion." See Wallis, supra note 11, at 401.
WINTER 2007
1166 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the trade in conflict diamonds and the global effort to create procedures and policies to
deal with the problem may have caused focus and public attention to be misplaced, or at
least untimely.24
7
Additionally, there is no independent monitoring system "to ensure that each nation
actually complies with the regulations and suggestions of the KPCS," and "without an
independent monitoring and supervisory agency institutionalized to oversee the conduct
and business practices of the diamond industry, ample opportunities for corruption and
diamond laundering exist. ' 248 Furthermore, statistical reporting submitted by participat-
ing countries is not based on any uniform reporting methodology, which makes statistical
comparison about imports and exports between or among countries particularly diffi-
cult.249 There are also indications that while the Kimberley Process was being imple-
mented, retail jewelers were not taking it seriously by failing to provide end users and
consumers with "a meaningful account of their policy" through a system of warranties. 250
Although there are flaws in the Kimberley Process and the CDTA, that is not to say
they are entirely ineffective or that they cannot be amended to be improved.2 51 To create
a more effective system to prevent the importation or exportation of conflict diamonds,
the U.S. GAO made a number of recommendations, including directing the Treasury De-
partment to analyze "what constitutes a normal excess of exports over imports" to improve
the "accuracy of U.S. rough diamond trade data".2 52 In addition, they recommended a
stricter plan for regular or periodic inspections of rough diamond imports and exports, "a
plan for confirming the receipt of imports,"2 53 and to the development and implementa-
tion of "a plan for providing some of the diamond-related assistance using a regional
approach so that countries within a region can harmonize aspects of their systems for
controlling the rough diamond trade across porous borders."2 54
While many of the GAO's recommendations concerned issues of quality control, over-
sight is no doubt a large concern, just as it is with the KPCS.255 Global Witness recom-
mends, as do others, that "without an independent monitoring and supervisory agency
247. While certain media campaigns have recently brought conflict diamonds into a much greater public
light, during the years after the Kimberley Process was implemented, the NGO community's "vigilance"
seemed to wane. The number of press releases from NGOs such as Global Wimess, Amnesty International,
and Partnership Africa Canada decreased significantly after the October 2004 Kimberley Process plenary
meeting, explained (and perhaps also compounded) by a "seeming intimation that the Kimberley Process
alone may not provide an adequate framework to solve all of the problems arising from the diamond trade."
See id. at 402-03.
248. Fishman, supra note 29, at 234-35.
249. Some participating countries report statistics late or not at all. Russia has long refused to submit any
statistics about its diamond industry, "despite the fact that it is one of the world's largest diamond producers,
[that] it has been a significant participant in the Kimberley Process almost since its inception" and was at one
time the Chair of the Kimberley Process. Often there is no penalty for late submissions or no submissions at
all. See Wallis, supra note 11, at 407-08.
250. See id. at 406-07 (internal quotations omitted).
251. That the Kimberley Process exists at all should be evidence that the problem has gained widespread
attention. For a general discussion of why the inception of the Kimberley Process, along with the pressure
and reporting brought by NGOs has helped the cause, see Wallis, supra note 11, at 3 98-400.
252. GAO-06-978, supra note 16, at 40.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 41.
255. "A system for controlling the trade in rough diamonds will be effective only if it has control mecha-
nisms designed to curtail or deter the trade in conflict diamonds." Id. at 38.
VOL. 41, NO. 4
DIAMONDS ARE A SMUGGLER'S BEST FRIEND 1167
institutionalized to oversee the conduct and business practices of the diamond industry,
ample opportunities for corruption and diamond laundering exist. ' 2 56 If there is no relia-
ble, independent monitoring system "to ensure that countries actively and responsibly
control their diamond trade, membership [in the KPCS] may lack true meaning. '25 7 The
KPCS may also benefit from a uniform system of punishment for violations; as it is
drafted, "the KPCS places no specific international or domestic enforcement duty upon
participating nations, and instead allows each nation to implement its own punishment
mechanism." 25 In addition, technological innovations like "geo-chemical" identification
can be used to make tracking diamonds a more efficient and accountable process. 259 At
the local level, increased security and control at the mines themselves can go far in making
sure that diamonds are not smuggled out without first being certified. "Close and non-
corrupt government supervision and inspection of the diamond miners and the mining
process from the beginning of the pipeline is an important aspect necessary in minimizing
the number of diamonds that reach the hands of rebels, and will serve as a significant step
toward economic growth." 260
V. Conflict Diamonds Today-The Calm After the Storm?
Today, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia are at a relative peace, and yet despite the fact
that more than 99 percent of diamonds are now "conflict free" and traded under the Kim-
berley Process, diamonds, and in particular conflict diamonds, are still a major issue in
working toward the stability of Africa as a continent.26' In 2006, on the third anniversary
of the Kimberley Process, Global Witness acknowledged that progress had been made but
noted the "need for more monitoring on the ground, to the 'excessive reliance on industry
self-regulation' and to the persistent refusal to make countries' diamond trading statistics
public."262 Such calls for increased scrutiny of the KPCS have been resurrected with the
growing concern over the Ivory Coast, which since 2002 has been involved in civil con-
flict.263 According to the UN, millions of dollars' worth of conflict diamonds have been
smuggled out of the Ivory Coast through neighboring Ghana, where they are certified as
conflict free. 264 The situation in the Ivory Coast highlights the shortcomings of the
256. Fishman, snpra note 29, at 234-35.
257. Kaplan, supra note 28, at 610.
258. The problem of not having an independent system of punishment is the apparent inconsistency that
may result, as one country's punishment for violations may be inconsequential when compared to another's.
See Fishman, supra note 29, at 235. Domestically, the USA Patriot Act, through its anti-money laundering
provisions, is a possible enforcement tool. See Maggi, supra note 20, at 540. For a good discussion on
whether De Beers can be held liable under U.S. antitrust laws, see Dorsett, supra note 26, at 161-74.
259. See Fishman, supra note 29, at 240.
260. Id. at 238.
261. Diamondfacts.org, The Facts, http://diamondfacts.org/facts/index.html
262. Nicol Degli Innocenti, Diamonds: Time to Review the Monitoring System The Kimberley Process, FIN.
Timi.s (London), July 17, 2006, at 2.
263. "Ivory Coast has been divided into a rebel-held north and government south since a 2002/03 civil war
and both rebels and allies of Laurent Gbagbo, the president, have been criticised for using natural resources,
including cocoa and oil as well as diamonds, to fund war efforts." See Dino Mahtani, Conflict Diamonds Smug-
gled into Ghana, Says UN Report, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2006, at 6.
264. Nicol Delgi Innocenti, Call for More Action to Ban Conflict Diamonds, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Nov.
4, 2006, at 8.
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Kimberly Process; as recently as 2005, a Kimberley Process resolution was passed setting
"unprecedented controls in west Africa to stop diamond smuggling."265 Ten months after
a team of Kimberley Process experts was sent to monitor the situation in the Ivory Coast,
their report had still not been drawn up.2 66
While the diamond-trading rebels from the Ivory Coast deny receiving revenues from
the diamonds, claiming that taxes on cocoa, cotton, and timber pay for their movement, 267
the more likely reality-that diamonds are once again being used to fund civil war-un-
derscores the sheer economic impact that diamonds are having on Africa, be that for bet-
ter or worse. Until the early 1990s, Zimbabwe was a thriving agricultural-based nation
and economy that provided food for nearly all countries in Southern Africa and brought in
foreign dollars through exports to both Asia and the West.2 68 With the collapse of the
agricultural industry, mining was adopted as an alternative source of generating revenue,
and diamonds are now "the most talked about and most sought after mineral in
Zimbabwe." 269 The sudden boom and interest in the diamond market has prompted
many already-impoverished Zimbabweans to try their hands at smuggling diamonds to
neighboring South Africa and Botswana, where they can fetch considerably higher
prices.2 70 The World Diamond Council has launched an investigation into the
Zimbabwean diamonds, fearing that they could make their way to illegal markets to be
mixed with conflict diamonds. 271 So far, 20,000 small miners have been arrested.2 72
What is so striking about Zimbabwe is that it is not only showing how much diamonds
can sway an economy but also how sanctions or a ban on diamonds could be counter-
productive. Because the diamonds mined in Zimbabwe would not fit with the Kimberley
Process working document definition of conflict diamond,273 Kimberley Process sanctions
such as restrictions on who the nation can trade diamonds with, would hurt an already
fledgling economy by further restricting its trade capabilities and possibly by encouraging
further illicit trading and smuggling through mere necessity. Such a reality echoes the
sentiments of many in the diamond industry who point to the economic benefits diamonds
bring to Africa. 274 For instance, "an estimated five million people have access to appropri-
ate healthcare globally thanks to revenues from diamonds," 275 and "the revenue from
diamonds is instrumental in the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic."276 In Botswana,
GDP annual growth has averaged seven percent since diamonds were discovered in Bot-
swana, 277 and today, every child, up to the age of thirteen, can receive free education
because of revenues from diamond exports.2 7s
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Ivorian Rebels Deny Illicit Diamond Trading; U.N. Panel Has Cited Millions in Sale, WASH. Pos-r, Dec. 8,
2006, at A34.
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These conflicting realities would seem to put the end consumer, to use the phrase
lightly, between a rock and hard place. A backlash against diamonds would injure the
legitimate market and counteract the progress that has been made since the plight of
conflict diamonds first came to the world's attention in 1998,279 and yet the need to end
the trade in conflict diamonds is very much alive. Whether the answer is in the Kimberley
Process, the CDTA, a united effort combining the two, or through some global effort to
eradicate Africa's social ills that give rise to the civil strife that fuel the fire of the conflict
diamond trade, change can and must come. After all, the Kimberley Process is just that, a
process. All one needs to do to see that is look at Ishmael.
After three years as a child soldier in the RUF, Ishmael Beah entered a Unicef-spon-
sored rehabilitation program after he was confined to a government hospital due to a
wound he received in battle.280 Gifted with poise and an articulate tongue, Beah became a
popular figure among UN officials and NGOs trying to bring awareness to the plight of
child soldiers around the globe.28 He eventually made his way to the United States,
where he enrolled in Oberlin College and graduated with a degree in political science.282
His memoir of his days in the RUF, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, sits on
bookshelves and in Starbucks' across the country, and his face graces magazines and talk
shows alike.28 3 Through his now-public journey, Ishmael has become a human face to a
problem for that for so very many, had always been so very far away.
If only they all could have been so lucky.
279. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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